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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

**NATIONAL
SENIOR CERTIFICATE**

GRADE 12

**HISTORY P2
NOVEMBER 2013
ADDENDUM**

This addendum consists of 17 pages.

QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE FALL OF COMMUNISM IN THE USSR INFLUENCE POLITICAL CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1990s?

SOURCE 1A

This source focuses on the consequences of Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policies for the USSR and Eastern Europe after 1985.

Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on 11 March 1985 and within weeks introduced the world to two new Russian words, 'glasnost' and 'perestroika'. Glasnost ended the Cold War. Gorbachev admitted the past mistakes of Soviet foreign policy, announced a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe and offered major concessions to end the arms race. President Reagan and the West were at first hesitant and wary of a new Soviet propaganda offensive, but over the course of four summits between 1985 and 1988 Reagan and Gorbachev ended the Cold War.

Perestroika was less successful and by 1988 the reforms of the economy and Communist Party had failed to win the confidence of the Soviet people. In January 1989 George Bush became President of the United States. Along with the rest of the West he watched in astonishment as the Soviet Union, against all expectations, imploded (collapsed) between 1989 and 1991. During 1989 the states of Eastern Europe split from Soviet influence and set in motion the procedure to elect democratic governments. On 9 November 1989 the Berlin Wall was demolished as the German people, impatient for reunification, moved faster than the politicians.

[From: *The Cold War* by B Lightbody]

SOURCE 1B

This cartoon by E Valtman was published in *The Waterbury Republican* on 31 August 1991.

Gorbachev beholds a crushed hammer and sickle



[From: *The Best Editorial Cartoons of the Year* by ES Valtman]

SOURCE 1C

The source by J Daniel below highlights how the fall of the Berlin Wall paved the way for change in South Africa.

It should be clear ... that by the time of the events around the Berlin Wall the momentum (drive) for change in South Africa was gathering pace. What the fall of the wall did was not to create the conditions for change but to push them forward and speed up the whole process. What it did was lessen the obstacles confronting those promoting a new way forward. It was, for example, now possible for FW de Klerk, under intense pressure from the United States and facing the prospect of intensified sanctions, to tell his critics that the Cold War was over. That 'we' had won and the Soviets had lost and that this in turn, weakened the ANC in that it lost its main sponsor. Consequently, he could argue it was now possible for the National Party to confront them politically and on a more even playing field. The ANC, he could argue, now had no choice but to negotiate ...

... while De Klerk and his top aides in the National Intelligence had read the Cold War signals post-1985 correctly, they were never able to understand the true realities of the nationalist struggle in Southern Africa where it was not the Soviet Union that was the problem. What was the problem for the white minorities were the legitimate (rightful) aspirations (hopes) of the black majority.

[From: *The Impact of the Cold War and the Fall of the Berlin Wall on Southern Africa* by J Daniel]

SOURCE 1D

This source consists of two extracts.

Extract 1: The following contains part of a speech that FW de Klerk delivered to parliament on 2 February 1990.

With the steps the government has taken it has proven its good faith and the table is laid for sensible leaders to begin talking about a new dispensation, to reach an understanding by way of dialogue (discussion). The agenda is open and the overall aims to which we are aspiring should be acceptable to all reasonable South Africans.

Among other things, those aims include a new democratic constitution; universal franchise; no domination; equality before an independent judiciary (court); the protection of minorities as well as of individual rights; ...

I wish to put it plainly that the government has taken a firm decision to release Mr Mandela unconditionally. I am serious about bringing this matter to finality without delay. The government will take a decision soon on the date of his release.

[From: *The Argus*, 6 February 1990]

Extract 2: This extract focuses on W Esterhuyse's interpretation of FW de Klerk's 2 February 1990 speech.

The speech had a dramatic impact on the ANC, and not only because the organisation had insisted on prior notification of matters such as Nelson Mandela's release and unbannings. There had been expectations on the part of the ANC leaders that De Klerk would create a climate for negotiations in an incremental (growing) fashion. Many Afrikaners had thought so too. I, for one, had believed that De Klerk, given his political cautiousness and conservative roots, would not have the courage to take what Terre'Blanche referred to as a quantum (big) leap. De Klerk proved the ANC and many other people wrong. In particular, he proved that he did not fear the rightists and would not allow them to dictate politics. With a single speech he brought about everything that was required to create a climate for negotiations: the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of organisations, and the return of exiles.

Mbeki, too, was caught off guard by the timing and magnitude (importance) of De Klerk's announcement. There was nothing in the speech from which the ANC or the United Democratic Front (UDF) could extract any political gain. De Klerk was the man of the moment. The ANC also did not know exactly when Mandela would be released. De Klerk kept the ANC guessing ... He might have been wrong-footed by the timing and scope of the announcement, but he was by no means uncertain. Indeed, in October 1989 I had already returned from England with a message from Thabo Mbeki to the National Intelligence Service: 'Unban one, unban all.'

[From: *Secret Talks and the End of Apartheid, Endgame* by W Esterhuyse]

QUESTION 2: WHAT IMPACT DID THE FALL OF COMMUNISM HAVE ON ANGOLA IN RE-IMAGINING ITSELF AFTER THE 1990s?

SOURCE 2A

The account below was written by a former Angolan citizen. He outlines how Angola was influenced by Cold War tensions between the USA and the USSR.

Even into the 1980s, Angola was a country in which the United States and the Soviet Union used proxy (alternative) forces to compete for influence and supremacy. While the Soviets and Cubans continued to prop up the Marxist regime (MPLA) in the capital city of Luanda, the Americans, along with the South Africans, sustained (maintained) Jonas Savimbi's rebel group, UNITA ... The overall cost of this civil war was enormous, both economically and physically, for the people of Angola. During the 1980s alone, more than four hundred thousand of Angola's population died, and many more were maimed (wounded/hurt), as well as about three million more were uprooted from their rural areas and their homes.


The first glimpse of peace in Angola's interminable (endless) civil war came in 1990, as the Cold War drew to a close. Portugal, the United States, and even Russia, began talks to bring peace to Angola. Finally in May of 1991, at a meeting between President Dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi, an agreement was signed to end sixteen years of warfare between these two leaders. But suspicion and mistrust, the sign of the day, would never change. In reality, the MPLA and its president had built a culture of corruption and an authoritarian party in the hands of a small elite group, long accustomed to wielding power ... This kind of power grabbing has proved disastrous. For fifteen years Angola's government had enforced a Soviet-inspired system of centralised planning and nationalisation, causing the collapse of both industrial and agricultural production ...

When Jonas Savimbi rejected the election results of 1992 all of his loyal friends across America and South Africa were dismayed with his refusal to accept his election defeat ... War had restarted again and it looked like Dos Santos, the president of Angola, was not one for negotiations by peaceful means ...

[From: *Angola, Land of Shattered Dreams* by Z Santana]

SOURCE 2B

This cartoon by Zapiro appeared in the *Sowetan* on 17 November 1994. It depicts the impact of the civil war on Angolan citizens.



[From: Zapiro: The Madiba Years by J Shapiro]

Angola worst
amputee
nation

SOURCE 2C

This source consists of a written and a visual source on the effects of civil war on Angola.

Written Source: The following extract focuses on the devastation that the years of civil war had on Angola's infrastructure.

It is almost impossible to describe the devastation (destruction) produced by more than 30 (thirty) years of continuous conflict. Everything needs to be reconstructed: bridges, streets and roads, communications systems, airstrips, hospitals and schools. Hundreds of thousands of people live in shantytowns of utmost squalor (dirtiness) and misery on the outskirts of the capital.

Luanda now has four million inhabitants, but only about 20 000 (twenty thousand) of them have running water or modern toilets. Whole sections – always the poorer – of its capital are a vision of hell, 'ringed by mountains of garbage' and 'soaked by rivulets (rivers) of human waste'. As far back as 1994 it was estimated that it would require 22 000 (twenty-two thousand) dump trucks to remove Luanda's accumulated refuse, and that was when the city was just half its current population of 4,5 million.

The government could easily afford to build a sewage treatment plant and pipe drinking water from nearby rivers to the city. In the absence of such services, millions of Luanda's poor pay up to 10 000 (ten thousand) times more for drinking water – transported by expensive private delivery trucks – than the elite, who merely open a tap.

[From: *Africa 2007* by C Cutter]

Please turn over for the Visual Source.

Visual Source: This photograph was taken by LJ Bothma in October 2010. It shows bridges over the Cuchi River.



New bridge

Old bridge

Temporary bridge

[From: *Anderkant Cuito, 'n Reisverhaal van die Grensoorlog* by LJ Bothma]

QUESTION 3: HOW DID THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS PAVE THE WAY FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN 1994?

SOURCE 3A

This source consists of a written and a visual source.

Written Source: This source outlines the reasons for De Klerk's 2 February 1990 speech.

However, 2 February 1990 was possibly the most remarkable day in the history of white minority rule for being the moment at which the inevitability of its own failure was openly admitted. When De Klerk unbanned the ANC, the PAC and the South African Communist Party; announced that Nelson Mandela would soon be released unconditionally; lifted emergency restrictions on organisations such as the UDF and Cosatu; released scores of political prisoners; lifted media restrictions; and declared that the time had come to create a 'totally new and just dispensation' based on equality, the scope and nature of national politics changed for good. By the admission of the government itself, the days of white rule were numbered. His 2 February speech arguably restored the confidence of both South Africa and the international world. Without 'drastic change', he warned, there would be nothing but 'growing violence, tension and conflict'. It was time to talk openly and freely about reshaping the character of the South African state.


Reaction to the speech was immediate and acclamatory (full of praise). Archbishop Desmond Tutu declared that De Klerk 'has taken my breath away'. Newspaper headlines such as 'South Africa and the World Rejoice' and 'South Africa breaks through the political sound barrier' were typical. It was, Nelson Mandela later wrote: 'a breathtaking moment, for in one sweeping action [De Klerk] had virtually normalised the situation in South Africa. Our world had changed overnight.'

The lone voice of despair and outrage was that of the white right. Conservative Party leader Dr Andries Treurnicht declared De Klerk's speech – probably accurately – as 'the most revolutionary speech I have ever listened to in this parliament during the last 19 years'. Unbanning the ANC, the PAC and the Communist Party was 'absolutely outrageous' (shocking).

[From: *Every Step of the Way: The Journey To Freedom In South Africa* by the Ministry of Education]

Please turn over for the Visual Source.

Visual Source: This cartoon by Gorrell is dated April 1994. It depicts 'White Rule' releasing black South Africans.



"YOU'RE FREE!... MIGHTY BIG OF ME, ISN'T IT?"

[From: *Nelson Mandela: A Life in Cartoons* by H Dugmore et al.]

SOURCE 3B

The source below consists of a written and a visual source.

Written Source: This is an extract of the meetings that were held between the National Party and the African National Congress in 1990.

On 2 May 1990 the NP and the ANC began a two-day series of 'talks about talks' at the historic Groote Schuur homestead in Cape Town. It was at this grand former residence of South African heads of government that the two parties sat across a large dining-room table and identified the obstacles to negotiations and ways of overcoming them. The meeting was very tense – both sides were highly suspicious of each other.

During this meeting, the ANC refused to accede to the NP's key demand to disband MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe). De Klerk needed this concession to allay fears in the white community. Although the NP had made important shifts, it still saw the protection of white 'group' interests as its core mission and wanted to keep tight control over the process of transition. Neither party, however, had a clear plan as to how it would proceed. They found themselves on uncharted waters and both, on reflection, saw the need to remain as flexible and open as possible.

The meeting ended with what De Klerk and Mandela described as a 'broad agreement' between the parties, in the form of the historic Groote Schuur Minute.

This compromise, labelled a 'historic truce', allowed the process of negotiations to continue in good faith. Final agreement was then reached on the issues of the release of political prisoners and the return of political exiles. The government also agreed to review security legislation in order to ensure free political activity and end the state of emergency in Natal. The Pretoria Minute concluded: 'We are convinced that what we have agreed upon today can become a milestone on the road to true peace and prosperity for our country. The way is now open to proceed towards negotiations on a new constitution. Exploratory talks in this regard will be held before the next meeting, which will be held soon.'

[From: *One Law, One Nation: The Making of the South African Constitution* by L Segal]

Please turn over for the Visual Source.

Visual Source: The following was the main headline that appeared in the *Sunday Times* on 6 August 1990. It focuses on the Pretoria talks that were held between the ANC and the NP.



[From: *One Law, One Nation: The Making of the South African Constitution* by L Segal]

SOURCE 3C

This source focuses on the reaction of right-wing political parties to the process of negotiations.

Mr Terre'Blanche warned that the right-wing was uniting to destroy CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa). 'We will form a joint offensive with the Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nasionale Party to do so,' he told about 1 200 supporters ...

Earlier in the week a South African Police officer investigating right-wing activity said the right-wing threat was being viewed 'in a serious light'. 'They tend to link their attacks to specific events, and CODESA II is likely to produce a new spate of bombings,' he said.

[From: An extract from *The Sunday Times*, 2 February 1992]

QUESTION 4: WHAT ROLE DID THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) PLAY IN HEALING SOUTH AFRICA FROM ITS DIVIDED PAST?

SOURCE 4A

This is an extract by Desmond Tutu which stipulates the conditions for the granting of amnesty.

The only conditions for gaining amnesty were:

- Human rights violations which occurred between 1960, the year of the Sharpeville massacre, and 1994, when President Mandela was inaugurated as the first democratically elected South African head of state.
- The act must have been politically motivated. Perpetrators did not qualify for amnesty if they killed because of personal greed, but they did qualify if they committed the act in response to an order by, or on behalf of, a political organisation, such as the former apartheid state and its satellite Bantustan homelands, or a recognised liberation movement such as the ANC or PAC.
- The applicant had to make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to the offence for which amnesty was being sought.

If those conditions were met, the law said that amnesty 'shall' be granted. Victims had the right to oppose applications for amnesty by trying to demonstrate that these conditions had not been met, but they had no right of veto over amnesty.

[From: *No Future Without Forgiveness* by D Tutu]

SOURCE 4B

This extract by former President Thabo Mbeki focuses on the importance of telling the truth at the TRC hearings.

The great crevices (gaps) in our society which represented the absence of a national consensus about matters that are fundamental to the creation of the new society are also represented by the controversy which seems to have arisen around the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

The hatred and animosity (hostilities) of the past will not go away unless the truth is told about what happened. The telling of the truth is painful to all of us. Where gross violations of human rights have occurred on either side of the conflict, they cannot but diminish anyone of us who were the perpetrators.

We are diminished by the acts which occurred, and not by their recounting to the Commission and the nation. Something of what we are worth will be restored by the courage we show by telling the truth and admitting that a wrong was done where it was done.

[From: *The Life And Times Of Thabo Mbeki* by A Hadland and J Rantao]

SOURCE 4C

This source consists of two extracts.

Extract 1: This extract highlights Matthews Phosa's opinion of why the ANC should not apply for amnesty. Phosa was the premier of Mpumalanga at the time and was speaking at the launch of *Mpumalanga Times* newspaper (date unknown).

'There is an unbecoming tendency developing which seeks to equate the struggle against apartheid with those who enforced it despite the fact that apartheid was declared a crime against humanity by the UN,' he said.

On ANC members applying for amnesty to the TRC, he said: 'I hope not to be misunderstood as this has previously happened.' If the ANC members acted outside the organisation's policies and committed human rights violations, they definitely had to apply for amnesty. Similarly, if the TRC's investigation found any human rights violations then 'we should apply for amnesty', Phosa said. However, the ANC would not apply for amnesty for legitimate acts against apartheid.

Extract 2: This source focuses on the Conservative Party's response to the TRC's refusal to grant amnesty for two of its supporters.

The CP said on Wednesday it was 'shocked' that two right-wing political prisoners, Jean du Plessis and Jean van Wyk, had been refused amnesty. CP leader, Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg, claimed the refusal confirmed the bias of the TRC and that its sole intention was the 'destruction of the Afrikaners'. Hartzenberg said Du Plessis and Van Wyk qualified for amnesty on all criteria but were being refused amnesty by a 'clearly subjective commission'.

The alleged crimes in question occurred in 1991, long before the cut-off date for amnesty. In the case of Mr du Plessis, no one was injured or died in the action. 'This is in stark contrast to, for instance, the happenings at Shell House, in which case the attorney general recently decided that there would be no prosecution,' Hartzenberg said. 'This confirms the total partiality of the so-called TRC and that it has only one objective, namely the destruction of the Afrikaners. This left no doubt that there was no benefit in Afrikaners applying for amnesty and that Afrikaners should lend no credence (credibility) to the Commission,' Hartzenberg said.

[From: http://www.TRC/SAPA_11december1996_CP_shocked . Accessed on 30 January 2013]

SOURCE 4D

This cartoon is Dr Jack's view of the TRC report that was presented to President Nelson Mandela by the TRC chairperson Archbishop Desmond Tutu in 1998. The word 'ELUSIVE' means 'difficult to catch'.



[From: Nelson Mandela – A life in Cartoons by H Dugmore]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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